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Insurance has been a transnational business for centuries. However, it is not surprising that the insurance industry was not an early adopter of the Johnny-come-lately, ‘borderless’ internet with its traditional methods of doing business based on verification, assessment and pricing of individual risks, established local channels of distribution tied to independent brokers and complex regulatory requirements that typically follow jurisdictional boundaries. All businesses are under pressure to use IT to innovate, hone business models, differentiate services, add value, lower costs, monitor performance and provide enhanced customer satisfaction that can arise from greater efficiency and timeliness of standardised global processing and customisation of services and to exploit IP, data and knowledge in new ways.​[1]​ They are also driven to develop new markets and create broader brand awareness including via the social networking technologies. Thus, the insurance industry is now nearly globally pursuing these efficiencies and other benefits of the internet.
While various legal issues arise in implementing electronic systems for business operations and processes, few are uniquely significant to the insurance industry, likely arising from the interface of laws governing electronic commerce with insurance regulation which this chapter considers. The former are also important to insurance industry businesses; a brief examination of some of these is worthwhile. This chapter addresses such e-commerce legislation designed to enable valid formation of contracts online and their legal recognition. It also considers issues such as governing jurisdiction and law where access to websites is global and some potential areas of liability arising from the transacting of insurance business online.
[a]2. E-BUSINESS AND E-COMMERCE
E-business refers to the use of electronic applications, information systems and digital networks in business functions not necessarily related to selling and buying online via the World Wide Web, or what is commonly referred to as e-commerce. Much e-business, for example automated supply transactions and payment processing, predates the commercial internet, having been conducted for decades via electronic data interchange (EDI) over dedicated networks in business to business commerce (B2B). EDI, a computer-to-computer exchange of messages, represents documents via data formats strictly structured according to a set of agreed message standards. These applications typically involve human intervention only for error correction, quality assurance or specific pre-specified situations.​[2]​ Traditionally, EDI involved relationships between existing trading partners.​[3]​ Its use, however, has expanded.​[4]​ With EDI, there is often an overarching trading-party agreement regarding the standards used, with provisions for the legal effect of data messages exchanged.​[5]​ 
Numerous EDI standards​[6]​ have been developed for industry-specific formats meeting specific needs, including the insurance industry’s.​[7]​ Others were developed at national and international levels, for example the EDI formats for exchanging medical insurance claims and payment under the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)​[8]​ and UN EDIFACT.​[9]​ 
The legal issues surrounding the formation, validity and admissibility of such electronic supply and other business contracts and their related messages are not new; vast numbers of contracts have been concluded, electronic ‘messages’ ‘written’ and exchanged and obligations undertaken via EDI since the 1960s. As with most new technologies in the history of the world, commerce usually adapts and goes on. If legal systems’ existing rules are flexible enough to accommodate the technology, to the extent traditional contractual elements are found to exist, for example a valid offer by one party that is accepted by the other in a manner evidencing intent to be bound, the contract will likely be enforceable, despite being made electronically.
Under private law of contract regarding party autonomy, overarching trading-party agreements referenced above would likely suffice to evidence the parties’ intent with respect to the referenced set of electronic contracts, even where the process was fully automated. These could include, for example, the scope of underwriting authority in electronic placement systems, a key factor in a recent California Court of Appeal decision regarding the intermediary’s status as agent or broker. Munn v Eastwood Insurance Services, Inc.​[10]​ was a class action alleging unfair and deceptive business practices arising from the defendant’s charging of brokerage fees in addition to its possible receipt of commissions in placing automobile coverage. In upholding the lower court’s reliance on the totality of the circumstances to conclude that the defendant had not acted as the agent of the insurer, the Court of Appeal found that despite completing an electronic application which resulted in a nearly instantaneous decision binding the risk, Eastwood did not engage in field underwriting as he did not have authority to bind the insurer, as evidenced by the brokerage agreement and underwriting manual which contemplated the use of the systems. Although the broker had expertly elicited and entered correct information from prospective insureds and ported it from one application to another, the nearly instantaneous underwriting was done by the insurer which had established and entered its own risk criteria into the software system and that of the comparative rating system used by the broker.​[11]​ The insurer’s software system detected whether or not the application was properly completed and fell within underwriting criteria with an acceptance or rejection.​[12]​ Thus, the placement process’s automation did not alter the agreed intent of the parties on the issue of authority to bind a contract electronically (or otherwise) as indicated in their overarching trading partner agreements here, the brokerage agreement and the underwriting manual.
Trading-partner agreements can also create certainty in other possibly grey legal areas in an electronic transaction such as choice of law and jurisdiction since courts will typically recognise the terms of the agreement as controlling. They can create a private legal framework where the law has yet to develop.
Legal uncertainty is not unusual when new technology interfaces with traditional legal frameworks. For example, the laws of many jurisdictions use terms such as ‘in writing’ or ‘signed by the parties to be charged’ or ‘mailed’, that, while not necessarily excluding electronic communications, clearly intend to reference physical documents and processes involving their creation. Also, many jurisdictions have not only such form but also signature requirements for certain contracts whether under statutes of fraud or because of the nature of the rights at issue such as marriage or succession rights or specific statutory definitions of what comprises a ‘signature’.​[13]​ Uncertainty as to whether an electronic document or signature fulfils these requirements impedes their use. While specific and detailed trading-party agreements can be a good solution for regular B2B trading partners (subject to the provisions of any governing legislation or regulation), these are too costly and impractical for mass use such as e-commerce, with consumers requiring electronic contract formats such as the web-based forms.​[14]​ To address this, governments can change the applicable substantive laws including, for example, contract and consumer protection laws, to eliminate the form requirement or can adapt the legal system to accommodate e-commerce. Due to the latter’s broader impact, national, regional and international efforts were directed to developing lex specialis that addressed legal impediments to validity and enforceability of electronic contracts and that provided for legal recognition of electronic equivalents of signatures. These also sought to enhance cross-border enforceability by offering harmonising principles which can be implemented as chosen by national legislatures. Notable in this regard are the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Laws on Electronic Commerce 1996 and Electronic Signatures 2001 and the more recent UN Convention of the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005, not yet in force.
The UNCITRAL Electronic Commerce Model Law provides a set of internationally agreed model rules for national legislatures to consider regarding legal recognition of and non-discrimination towards electronic equivalents for paper-based concepts like ‘writings’, ‘signatures’ and ‘original’; the Electronic Signature Model Law developed further concepts regarding the legal roles of signatures, including, for example, to identify the origin of the message and authenticate its contents, and addressed how these can be functionally met by electronic equivalents. 
Although without binding effect,​[15]​ these Model Laws have been the source of such lex specialis in numerous jurisdictions,​[16]​ including the EU’s Electronic Commerce​[17]​and Electronic Signature​[18]​ Directives as well as the US Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),​[19]​ a model law largely adopted by most states. The US Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (‘E SIGN’)​[20]​ is premised on EUTA and pre-empts state law unless the official EUTA text or an equivalent provision is adopted by the state. The following briefly considers the UNCITRAL provisions regarding electronic contract and the US and EU laws grounded in them.
[b]2.1 Electronic Contracting
The UNCITRAL Electronic Commerce Model Law in a fairly simple way addresses effectiveness of electronic or ‘data messages’ in commercial transactions, intended to include insurance.​[21]​ It provides that information is not to ‘be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on grounds that it is in the form of a data message’.​[22]​ This includes ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’ in the formation and validity of a contract, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.​[23]​ The validity provisions permit information incorporated by reference to have legal effect.​[24]​ This could encompass information accessed by hyperlink but not itself recited in the contract terms other than by reference.​[25]​ Where law requires a ‘writing’, either via a positive obligation or consequence for a failure thereof, the data message is satisfactory if it is subsequently usable for reference.​[26]​ 
An ‘original’ writing requirement is met when there are reliable assurances that the integrity of the information continues from its generation to its final form and is capable of being displayed.​[27]​ The Model’s Guide to Enactment indicates that while this provision was particularly intended to address negotiable instruments, it could have reference to an insurance certificate, noting the necessity that these be transmitted in original form to give the parties confidence and to mirror paper-based environments where an original is usually required to prevent any alterations that would be difficult to detect in a copy.​[28]​
The Model provisions govern the effective time of messages and provide that dispatch occurs when the message enters a system outside of the originator’s or its agent’s control and is received when it enters the system designated by the addressee or, if another system, when retrieved by the addressee.​[29]​ Default rules for place of receipt in absence of agreement, provisions regarding when a message can be attributed to a party, even when automated,​[30]​ and acknowledgment of receipt are further addressed to ensure contract formation. As party autonomy is a key principle of the Model Law, such default rules are generally alterable as per the parties’ agreement, unless applicable law provides otherwise.
The EU’s Electronic Commerce Directive, while compatible with its basic principles, is broader than the Model Law. In addition to requiring validity of electronic contracts, the Directive also provides a minimally harmonised legal framework for the single market provision of e-commerce services​[31]​ on a cross-border, online basis throughout the EU. ​[32]​ The Directive requires, with possible exceptions for certain transactions,​[33]​ that Member States ensure that electronic contracts are legally valid and remove prohibitions or restrictions on their use.​[34]​ As noted by a technical working group created by the Insurance Committee, Internal Market Directorate General, to assess potential for further convergence of insurance and e-commerce: 
[quotation]The E-Commerce Directive applies to the insurance sector as to all other financial services. The fact that insurance activity falls under the scope of the directive will make it possible to conclude insurance contracts by electronic means (e.g. internet). Member States are thus obliged to lift the existing provisions prohibiting/impeding the offer/conclusion of insurance products over the internet, be it internally or on a cross-border basis.​[35]​[/quotation]
Since the Directive encompasses insurance within the provisions regarding electronic contract formation and recognition, where the law requires an insurance contract to be in writing, electronic contracts should suffice absent application of a narrow ‘public good’ exclusion. Yet, written form requirements for insurance contracts persist. For example, the Dutch Civil Code of Procedure was only recently amended to recognise the validity of electronic insurance contracts.​[36]​ In the UK, contracts of marine insurance and certain contracts of insurance without consideration are required to be in writing.​[37]​ Yet as the ‘writing’ requirement at common law for these can be contrasted with other insurance contracts that could be oral or found to exist within the construction of other various documents,​[38]​ there is no reason why this should preclude an electronic writing. 
The E-commerce Directive also provides a process framework for concluding electronic contracts, including pre-contract information requirements about the provider and transaction in a way that can be accessed and reproduced and the steps for concluding the transaction to the consumer and those transactions not otherwise agreed by non-consumers. The latter thereby sets a default position for concluding electronic B2B transactions.​[39]​ The informational requirements are in addition to any other informational requirements imposed on the service provider under Community law. For insurance these could be considerable under, first, the insurance directives which control the cross-border provision of services, with the additional possible overlay of host state contractual rules and policy disclosure and other information requirements applicable.​[40]​ 
In the US, UETA has been adopted by 47 states.​[41]​ UETA’s purpose is to ensure that ‘an electronic record of a transaction is the equivalent of a paper record, and that an electronic signature will be given the same legal effect, whatever that might be, as a manual signature’.​[42]​ Its basic rules, taken from UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce, provide that:
[bl]
	A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form (sec 7(a)).
	A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation (sec 7(b)).
	If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies (sec 7(c)).
	If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies (sec 7(d)).[/list]
Agreement by both parties is necessary for validity of an electronic transaction. Agreement can be fully automated and determined from the context and circumstances.​[43]​ UETA does not supersede other laws’ information requirements except that such information can be provided electronically only if in a format permitting retention by the recipient.​[44]​ 
The contract provisions of the E SIGN Act are premised on EUTA’s basic rules. However, E SIGN is narrower, requiring consent to electronic records only in consumer transactions with certain prior disclosures such as how consent can be withdrawn as well as consumer opt-in for electronic provision of information required under other laws.​[45]​ These requirements cannot be varied by agreement. The operation of E SIGN with state law is not always apparent. The statute provides a limited, specific exemption for states that have adopted UETA, either prior or subsequent to its enactment. Thus, it is possible for state lex specialis not to mention E SIGN and as well for the substantive and procedural form requirement provisions of state law, including insurance law, adopted prior to UETA not to reference it.​[46]​
Although these laws all seem to anticipate electronic insurance contracts’ validity, the informational and other compliance requirements of insurance regulation for electronic product advertising, sale and servicing via a website will present considerable challenges. This is especially true with individual life and health, personal lines and small commercial risks where insurance regulatory content disclosure and form requirements including readability scores and type size​[47]​will likely apply, as well as those under more general consumer protection statutes. With consumers’ ability to opt out of electronic records such as under E SIGN, insurers will also need to maintain traditional systems of delivery for notices, policies and post-sales information and processing.
[b]2.2 Electronic Signatures
Authenticating the electronic doctrine’s origin and the integrity of its contents not only helps parties dealing at a distance to have confidence in the transaction but would be essential to prove the contract in a court of law. Reliability of the record and its relevance to the issue are generally the primary considerations for admissibility into evidence in most legal systems. The authenticity of electronic data could be a threshold evidentiary issue for the court before the question of fact as to whether the data in the records give rise to a valid contract. One court recently concluded this in the context of emails urged by the parties to show applicable insurance policy terms. In Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company,​[48]​ the US District Court of Maryland found the parties’ failure to authenticate their email correspondence rendered it inadmissible into evidence to show the disputed terms of an insurance policy. 
There are numerous ways that records giving rise to a contract or otherwise required by law, such as tax reporting, can be ‘signed’ electronically, possibly authenticating its origin and binding the author to its contents, two functions of a handwritten signature. These can include, inter alia, a handwritten signature on a document electronically transmitted such as via fax or a scanned email attachment, an e-pad signature at point of sale or delivery, typed initials in a web form, or an email with the email address of the sender. Each can serve the functions of a signature, depending on the circumstances.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001), building on the principles of the Electronic Commerce Model Law, provides a broad and technologically neutral legal definition: ‘Electronic signature’ means data in electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated with, a data message,​[49]​ which may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory’s approval of the information contained in the data message’.​[50]​ It then addresses legal recognition at Article 6, stating: 
[quotation]Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.[/quotation]
This permits a sliding scale of legal recognition based on reliability sufficient for the transaction and according to the circumstances, enabling any technological format of signature to suffice in a particular situation. Thus, for example, an email using the typed name of the party and an email address identifying that party and seeming to be sent in the ordinary course of business could be sufficiently reliable in certain circumstances such as where the parties have had a course of dealings by email. However, since email contents can be easily altered in a reply, email accounts can be hacked or an email account opened in someone else’s name, the ultimate reliability of email is questionable and very possibly inadequate for other transactions.
Also, original data messages are technologically indistinguishable from copies, bear no unique handwritten signature and are not on paper where a change might be detected. Fraud potential is, further, considerable due to ease of intercepting and altering electronic messages without detection and processing speeds for multiple transactions. To address such concerns, the Model offers a legal test for reliability equivalent to functions of a handwritten signature in contributing to the integrity and approval (or non-repudiation) of the contents and authenticity/identity of its origins. It requires a signature to be considered legally reliable where the following cumulative factors are met:
[quotation: list]
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory and of no other person; 
(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is detectable; and 
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.​[51]​ [/quotation]
EU Directive 1999/93/EC on Electronic Signatures, while not as broad as the Model, encompasses these key concepts. Via the definition of an electronic signature, it adopts the concept of functional equivalence. Electronic data logically associated with or attached to other electronic data which can serve as a method of authentication comprises an electronic signature. This could be, for example, an ‘I accept’ button, a PIN, or a typed name on an email that can be recognised. However, the Directive does not alter Member State law with regard to the conclusion and validity of contracts or legal requirements as to form. Rather, it requires only that electronic signatures not be denied admissibility solely because they are in electronic form.
As with the Model Law, the EU E-Signature Directive premises its requirement for legal reliability of a particular signature on the use of signature certified by a trusted third party, or certification authority. Although this suggests PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) as a default technology, it may not preclude the use of other technologies.​[52]​ Both the Model and the EU Directive have provisions concerning liability and obligations of certification authorities partly to promote cross-border acceptance of certificates and uptake of their services. While the Directive has been effective for over ten years; the regulatory and technological infrastructure continues to evolve, including with respect to insuring documents.​[53]​
Other countries have based their laws governing electronic signatures on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, including China (2004), India (2009) and Mexico (2003).​[54]​ Many others adopted laws based on the electronic signature provisions in the earlier Model Law on Electronic Commerce.​[55]​ Thus the basic principles regarding the validity of electronic signatures are widespread. Despite this, or perhaps due to this, there would seem to be little, if any, case law regarding the use of electronic signatures in connection with insurance contracts.​[56]​ The few cases found by the author involving such electronic signatures, other than the emails previously discussed in Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company,​[57]​ did not address the issue.​[58]​ This may also, as noted in Lorraine, be due to the failure to apply the same evidentiary rigour to electronically-stored information as other information, for a range of reasons, including confusion by lawyers and courts.
Cross-border recognition of electronic signatures will remain of concern for e-commerce until there is greater legal clarity and easily accessible technological infrastructure for and the consumer take-up of digital signatures or other enhanced authentication measures. Meanwhile, appropriate clauses reflecting party choice could often serve to address the situation, including provisions as to what comprises a satisfactory signature and agreement to be subject to laws recognising electronic signatures as legal equivalents.
[a]3. AREAS OF LEGAL LIABILITY AND JURISDICTION
Most businesses have an online presence, even if just an informational, passive website. Yet, even this limited internet presence is global since websites can be accessed almost anywhere. Other forms of social media also have global reach. Theoretically, mere access could give rise to the applicability of the law and jurisdiction of countries other than the business’s place of domicile. This section considers legal principles underlying the exercise of jurisdiction in an online insurance context. In tandem, it considers some potential areas of liability that might give rise to an exercise of cross-border jurisdiction.
[b]3.1 Regulatory Compliance
[c]3.1.1 Insurance
Insurance is a regulated industry. Its actors must typically be authorised to conduct an insurance and, with some products, investment business within a jurisdiction, including advertising and making product offers. Additionally such offers, product descriptions and other insurance-related content must generally comply with, inter alia, any applicable insurance and securities disclosure and advertising regulations of the applicable jurisdiction, whether these are on a website, blog or other form of electronic communications application such as sponsored links on third-party search engines or other sites, Twitter, or Facebook.​[59]​ As one US securities regulator advised, such ‘[e]lectronic communications may fall under any one of the listed categories of communications, namely, correspondence, public appearances, advertisements, sales literature, reprints and institutional sales material’ and thus be subject to the variant rules governing these categories.​[60]​ In another example, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) recently released guidance as to the use of sponsored links and search engines by financial services providers. This notes, for example, that a sponsored advertising link appearing in connection with an unrelated search term would fail to meet the standards of ‘fair, clear and not misleading’.​[61]​ Thus, a search for a ‘guaranteed’ product that produced an advertisement via a sponsored link to a product without a guaranteed return would not comply with FSA advertising rules​[62]​ for regulated activity (and likely unfair commercial practice rules for non-regulated persons). Rules may also govern online revenue arrangements with non-authorised third-party advertisers/content hosters or how other entities such as portal operators can be paid where a structure similar to insurance commissions could create liability for the insurer.
Generally, whether mere online presence and global access is sufficient to trigger these compliance requirements and trigger liability for failure to comply or to be properly authorised has been resolved by regulators under evolving solutions that include criteria for whether the activity is directed at a jurisdiction.​[63]​ However, different criteria have been applied. For example, in the US where each state requires its own authorisation for doing an insurance business within that state (‘admitted basis’) or its conduct through special ‘surplus’ or ‘excess’ lines brokers (‘non-admitted basis’) where the admitted market does not meet the need, the New York State Insurance Department clarified its position as to advertisement online, stating:
[quotation]The Department does not consider the mere maintenance of a passive web site that is accessible to New York residents containing information about specific insurance products or services to constitute solicitation under New York Insurance Law. A web site that merely contains advertisements for insurance products or services also does not constitute solicitation [for which an authorisation would be required].
Internet advertisements for products or services of insurance companies, agents or brokers can appear in many forms, including banners, tiles, hypertext links, frames or embedded links. Such advertisements must be clearly delineated as such and are permitted to appear on the web site of a non-licensee even if it leads the consumer to, or is linked to, a web site where insurance solicitation takes place, as long as the advertisement or web site does not include, or the advertisement is not framed by, recommendations, endorsements or promotions from the non-licensee concerning the insurance products or services. Accordingly, a non-licensee hosting such advertisements on its web site may receive compensation calculated in any manner, including flat fees for such advertisements or fees that are based upon the amount of insurance business produced as a result of such advertisements. Advertisements that appear on the internet are subject to all applicable existing statutory and regulatory guidelines and restrictions applicable to advertisements in any other medium.
However, if the insurance products or services are not being offered by a New York authorized insurer, the advertisements or the web sites upon which the advertisements appear must contain a clear and conspicuous disclaimer indicating that the advertised products or services are not available in New York State, and such products and services cannot, in fact, be made available in New York. For example, a disclaimer stating ‘not available in all states’ would be sufficient. In such cases, compensation may not be based upon New York sales since such sales would violate the Insurance Law.​[64]​ [/quotation]
Other regulators have required affirmative steps to ensure that transactions are not processed in that jurisdiction, such as preventing payments by means of credit cards registered to out of jurisdiction addresses, etc.​[65]​ The FSA, for example, noting that only authorised entities are permitted to make available in the UK advertisements as to investment products, indicated that it might be satisfied by a disclaimer stating that the material was not aimed at persons in the UK, combined with a policy and practice of refusing to deal with or on behalf of UK residents who nevertheless access the site​[66]​ The same standard is likely to apply to non-investment insurance providers. 
Regulatory compliance in the EU concerning online insurance activity is more complex than with other individual jurisdictions as it is partly governed by the E-commerce Directive and partly by other EU and national legislation, including the various insurance directives and the Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive.​[67]​ While the EU legislation intends harmonisation, it is only minimum harmonisation with divergent national implementation. When this divergence is combined with individual Member State derogations permitted under the Directives, a complex layering of compliance requirements ensues, although theoretically only one Member State is considered as the controlling authority under the insurance directives. There is also overlap among the various consumer protection, e-commerce, distance selling of financial services and the various insurance directives as amended. The precise interface of all of these directives and their national implementation in 27 Member States is beyond the scope of this chapter. For purposes of e-commerce, the electronic contracting provisions of the E-commerce Directive and its ban precluding Member States from imposing a specific authorisation regime for taking up and providing online services,​[68]​ as noted, apply to insurance. Thus, Member States must ‘lift ... existing provisions prohibiting/impeding the offer/conclusion of insurance products over the internet, be it internally or on a cross-border basis’.​[69]​ Only insurance authorisations required under the Insurance Directives would apply.​[70]​ 
The E-Commerce Directive’s ‘country of origin’ regulatory regime limits regulation of information society services to the Member State of the entity’s establishment, with other Member States precluded from restricting its freedom to provide such services. Derogations from this country of origin regulation apply to insurance activities falling under Article 30 and Title IV of Directive 32/49/EEC, Articles 7 and 8 of Directive 88/357/EEC and Article 4 of Directive 90/619/EEC1 (the insurance directives),​[71]​ and on a case-by-case basis to proportionate Member State measures for the public good, including consumer and investor protection.​[72]​ The impact of the field derogations is that there exists potential for at least a dual, if not triple layer of regulation for online insurance advertising, sales and contracting activity. Online advertising by insurance undertakings is permitted, including on a cross-border basis without the need to notify the provision of services on a cross-border basis under the insurance directives which also provide a specific country of establishment regime.​[73]​ However, under the insurance directives, ‘EU insurers must nonetheless comply with the rules governing the form and content of such advertising where those rules can be shown by the Member State where the risk is located to be in the interest of the general good’.​[74]​ This requires conformity to whatever such national rules apply, rendering online cross-border EU advertising difficult at best.
The noted insurance directives’ derogation from the E-Commerce Directive ‘concerns only the activities of the insurance undertakings but not the activities of insurance intermediaries, who as a result – with respect to their on-line activities – are covered by the “internal market clause” of the E-Commerce Directive’.​[75]​ While the Insurance Mediation Directive applies to online transactions in conformity with the E-commerce Directive,​[76]​ there is an ongoing consultation regarding a revised insurance mediation directive.​[77]​ Under consideration are various definitions of cross-border activity with different localising factors which could impact notification, policyholder information requirements and other aspects of compliance differently. Their specific interface with the E-commerce Directive would also need to be analysed.
The derogation for insurance from Article 3 of the E-Commerce Directive, while governing the authorisation/notification and contract law provisions under the applicable sections of the insurance directives, does not apply to the insurance directive provisions on ‘pre-contractual information to policyholders’.​[78]​ As a result, the financial service provider must provide pre-contractual information for the electronic transaction of consumer financial services according to the rules in force in the Member State where it is established;​[79]​ the host state can, however, impose requirements in the public good under Article 3(4) of the E-commerce Directive which can be applied only on a case-by-case basis and imposed ordinarily only according to the mechanism of the article requiring a prior request to the home state to take measures which prove inadequate and notification to the Commission.​[80]​ 
Other pre-contractual information and other sales requirements are imposed under the Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive applicable to retail financial services, including banking, insurance, payment and investment services, pension funds negotiated by any means at a distance, such as by telephone, fax or over the internet, and not requiring the simultaneous physical presence of the parties to the contract. This, inter alia: (1) mandates specific information about the contract, its risks, total costs, potential for taxes, and about the supplier of the distance financial services, and its regulation if authorised, in durable medium such as email or CD; (2) provides for a 14-day ‘cooling-off’ period for the consumer; and (3) a right of withdrawal under certain circumstances.​[81]​ 
[c]3.1.2 Data protection and information security
Every enterprise in a networked environment should be concerned about the security, that is, the confidentiality, integrity and availability, of its systems and data. One reason for growing concern about the security of electronic information systems is a developing body of law and regulation imposing obligations of information security.​[82]​ Key sources of such regulation include a variety of privacy and data protection laws requiring security from unauthorised access, use, destruction, alteration or deletion. These include the EU Data Protection Directive,​[83]​ a broad scheme that generally applies to the processing of personal data in the EU Member States. The Directive would apply to insurers with a branch or other place of establishment in the EU in connection with the processing of personal data done in connection with the operations of that establishment, to personal data processed on equipment located in the EU stated to include end-user computer terminals, and to any data processing operations outsourced from the EU to a third country without adequate protection.​[84]​ Numerous jurisdictions have adopted regimes in an effort to meet the Directive’s ‘adequate’ requirement.
Other laws govern the protection of certain persons’ data, such as the US Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), applicable to operators of websites and online services directed at or which knowingly collect information from children under 13​[85]​ and which has international commerce jurisdictional application. Still others protect sector-specific data. These include, for example, the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) which requires that health information in connection with health insurance be kept private and secure, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), governing financial institutions including insurers, which has parallel rules for the security of customer personal data. Such data protection laws typically impose various fair information processing obligations, for example, the EU Data Protection Directive’s​[86]​ requirements of: a lawful basis for the processing of personal data based on consent or necessity; processing only for legitimate specified purposes and not further without another lawful basis; and deletion when not needed for these purposes. Processing has been construed to include the use of cookies and other software on the computers of users to collect their personal data,​[87]​ so that data collection by such means as cookies, clear pixels, etc. must comply with the recent requirements giving the user the ability to consent to the processing​[88]​ under the Data Protection Directive’s particularised application to online and other communications, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications (‘E Privacy Directive’).​[89]​ Both Directives have application in the context of numerous issues governing online processing, including controller status in the context of joint ventures​[90]​ which might arise in the context of industry portals or other online operations, use of location data in mobile commerce,​[91]​ use of social networks services for commercial purposes,​[92]​ and email and SMS for direct marketing, etc. Liability for data protection infringements can include significant fines.​[93]​ 
Such laws typically require ‘reasonable’ or ‘appropriate’ security be ensured by the person, or controller, responsible for the collection, storage and use of the personal data, that is, its processing.​[94]​ These generally are not static standards but vary according to the circumstances of the situation, including the nature of the data and the processing, for example via public networks. How security requirements are met is typically left to the controller. The EU Directive specifies only an obligation to provide appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of the data to be protected, taking into account the state of the art and the costs of implementation of the measures, that is, a risk/benefit analysis.​[95]​ The controller’s security obligations extend to the transfer of data to third countries​[96]​ and must be enforced by contracts with these third-party processors. No specific guidance is given. 
In contrast, both HIPAA and GLB have detailed security rules which address the steps of how reasonable and appropriate security should be approached.​[97]​ These, however, are process specifications, not specific instructions, for the implementation of administrative, technical and physical safeguards that address different aspects of information security as an active, ongoing process that encompasses the entire information system on which the protected information can be found or accessed. These safeguards describe what has been called a virtuous cycle of ‘plan, do, check, act’ that requires risk assessment and administrative planning, policies and implementation of, for example, employee training and employment policies, including for acceptable use of email, internet and electronic communications equipment, event monitoring and reporting, data back-up, procedures for access, authorisation, transmitting protected information, and handling security breaches as well as physical and technical implementation of the policies.​[98]​ 
In the US, the Federal Trade Commission has applied consumer protection powers regarding unfair and deceptive trade practices to failures to protect consumer personal data. While these initially involved a failure to adhere to stated privacy policies, the FTC subsequently has found unfair trade practices in light of failure to meet reasonable consumer expectations as to the security of their data implied in its collection.​[99]​ 
Some privacy-based laws provide incentives for security by imposing obligations on the data controller to notify the data subject of a security breach involving their personal data. These breach notification requirements exist under HIPAA,​[100]​ laws of a majority of US states​[101]​ and under the EU E Privacy Directive, with further notice obligations being considered beyond that imposed on electronic communications service providers.​[102]​ Not only is cost of notifications a concern, but research indicates an immediate but enduring and significant impact to corporate share price upon publication of a breach of trust beyond any direct or indirect costs arising from the notification and repair or replacement of the data and systems themselves.​[103]​ Recently, some US states have also enacted laws making vendors whose use of payment cards (credit or debit) fails to conform to Payment Card Industry standards responsible for reimbursing financial institutions for their expenses in replacing payment cards necessitated by a breach of security.​[104]​ 
Another very significant source of information security obligations is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a US statute regarding corporate transparency and ethical conduct. Enacted in response to the high-profile Enron and WorldCom financial scandals, SOX was intended to protect shareholders and the general public from accounting errors and fraudulent practices in the enterprise. It has global reach, applying to corporations traded on US stock exchanges and their subsidiaries. It does not impose a direct information security obligation. Rather, it requires information reporting by the CEOs and CFOs on significant events affecting the value of the company that should be known by shareholders and potential shareholders with attestations as to the accuracy of the reports and to the existence of effective internal controls and audit processes that allow them to say this, under penalty of personal financial or criminal sanction.​[105]​ Corporate officers cannot sign-off on accuracy of financial information if there is a possibility that it is based on corrupted, invalid or incomplete data. They cannot swear that effective internal controls exist if the systems implementing them are not up and secure. They also cannot supply records to document their filings unless kept on secure systems with uncorrupted and available data. Audit controls include assessment of third-party service providers which can include data-centre outsourcing, website operation and hosting, and other services involved in the use of electronic networks affecting integrity and availability of corporate data.​[106]​
Thus a growing global web of data protection and information security regulation is likely to require that insurers transacting business online ensure, inter alia, that their websites have clear privacy policies, conforming consent mechanisms based on the nature of the data and the processing purposes, and adequate security for any data collected. Insurers looking to outsource data processing and customer service operations should ensure both security and compliance with data protection obligations.​[107]​ The potential liability for failure to do so may be civil, administrative, and criminal for serious infractions.​[108]​ 
[b]3.2 Tort Liability
Liability for content of a website can arise in various ways. For example, inclusion of a person’s image without consent could give rise to civil liability where protected by privacy laws or personality rights in any country, and render the company potentially subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in that country. Copyright, trademark and other intellectual property rights infringement can also arise in connection with a website. Links to content on other sites has given rise to liability in certain circumstances where the linked-to content is infringing,​[109]​ and mirroring of linked content on one’s own servers could potentially give rise to copyright liability, since, although this enhances speed of access to the data, it technically comprises copying. The right to copy or reproduce the protected work is one of the exclusive rights of protected authorship under the copyright laws around the world and international treaty. Similarly, aggregator websites or price comparison sites that copy data from other sites in various ways may give rise to copyright infringement, including as a derivative work. The copying of a significant amount or compilation of data via web crawler software for use in product comparison sites could give rise to infringement under copyright laws based on the UK framework (e.g., in numerous Commonwealth countries) which protects the exercise of skill, judgment and labour in creating an original work and thus does not require that the work itself be creative.​[110]​ If involving significant amounts of data or small amounts taken in a systematic way from sources comprising a ‘database’ under the EU directive, liability for infringing the database right could arise.
Liability for copying and extracting information from a website including by automated means can arise under other legal theories, even where the information extracted/copied does not comprise a protected work under copyright, for example due to lack of creativity under some copyright laws, such as those of the United States. Thus, where the owner of the website includes code controlling robot access to the site​[111]​ or contractual terms for its use with the effect of prohibiting the use of webcrawlers, scrapers, bots, etc., or restricting the extraction of data for commercial purposes, or prohibiting uses which are unauthorised, liability under contract,​[112]​ computer misuse laws that control unauthorised access to systems​[113]​ and data or even common law theories of trespass to property,​[114]​ is possible.
While typically copyright infringement is pursued in the jurisdiction where the infringement occurred, this can also be potentially where unauthorised works are uploaded for further copying, where they are accessed, where they are downloaded, or also where the copyright owner sustains an economic injury.​[115]​ 
Unverified statements or employees’ postings on a blog with the seeming imprimatur of the employer could give rise to liability for defamation based merely on the ability to access it around the world, though posted and hosted in another country.​[116]​ Similarly, mere comparisons about a product or a service or competitor in one country could as well be defamatory or comprise unfair competition where accessed. The distributive nature of the internet means, moreover, that the servers and mirror servers are in many different locations with infringing content perpetuated and possibly difficult to remove, engendering further potential liability. Such scenarios require legal risk and jurisdictional analysis beyond the scope of this chapter. Generally, however, the factors determinant of the law and jurisdiction applicable to actions in tort or delict are based on localising tests similar to those involving contract, although with tort the options to choose jurisdiction or applicable law are likely limited. National private international law rules, including those of the individual EU Member States, typically base exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in civil matters on identified links to the territory, such as the place of contract or performance, locus of the tortious conduct, locus of the effect/harm from the conduct, nationality, residence or domicile, agreement to exclusive jurisdiction, and temporary physical presence, etc.​[117]​ Some countries such as the US and Canada​[118]​ apply a further analysis to ascertain whether the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with constitutional and other principles.
The US Supreme Court in International Shoe v Washington held that a sufficient level of minimum contacts with the forum state are necessary so as to fairly apprise a person that he might be brought before the courts there, and that the exercise of jurisdiction over an out of state defendant comport with constitutional notions of justice and fair play.​[119]​ Activity that shows a ‘purposeful availment of the benefits and protections’ offered by the state are required.​[120]​ Distinction is made between those contacts sufficient to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction which arises when the defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum state, and the claim results from injuries that arise out of or are related to those activities​[121]​ and general jurisdiction where the activity of the non-resident defendant must be sufficient to justify jurisdiction in any matter. The latter requires that the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are substantial and ‘continuous and systematic’ although unrelated to the cause of action.​[122]​ 
What level of contact satisfies the test of International Shoe in the context of the internet and electronic commerce has been further developed by the Court and considered in numerous lower cases, including under contract, trademark, copyright and defamation, etc. but not always consistently. Specific jurisdiction is likely but not always found where a defendant has reached out and created an obligation, for example under contract, to the citizens of another jurisdiction, and the claims are due to the consequences of those activities. Illustrative is a recent federal case, AA Automated Systems v Anderson that found two Florida residents amenable to Texas jurisdiction arising from their service agreement with a Texas corporation that provided insurance agencies with an internet-based computer software service called ‘Customer Account Representative OnLine,’ (CAROL). The defendants agreed to develop and host agency websites and email systems and provide the plaintiff and its customers with technical support for the CAROL system. In a fee dispute, the defendants allegedly withheld agency customer access to system data and defamed the plaintiff by claims to agency customers that it stole proprietary information. In considering jurisdiction, the Court found that the claims arose from the contract and, therefore, specific jurisdiction was applicable. It found, however, contacts justifying not only specific jurisdiction but also general jurisdiction in light of an ongoing contract and continuing obligations, as evidenced by large payments for past and future services as well as a continuing relationship via email and telephone contacts. As the defendant actively pursued this activity and created obligations in the forum state, jurisdiction in connection with those obligations was not unfair.​[123]​ 
Somewhat in contrast and worth considering in light of the number of top-level domain names still obtained from US registrars is AOL v Chih-Hsien Huang​[124]​ where the court concluded that online contracts for two domains made with a domain name registrar in Virginia by a Chinese business, without more, was insufficient activity there to make constitutional its exercise of jurisdiction.​[125]​ The defendant had no other contacts with the forum state beyond the contracts and their payment. Its activities in connection with the distribution and marketing of its software products and services including a communications protocol ‘ICQ’ were targeted at Asia, as evidenced by its Chinese language code and marketing materials. 
The availability of a passive, informational website has generally been insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction in the US where the defendant has no other contacts with the forum. Zippo Manufacturing v Zippo.com​[126]​ furthered this doctrine using a sliding-scale approach with jurisdiction dependent on the level of interactivity of a website, from passive to highly interactive sites. This doctrine, although followed in a number of cases, has recently lost currency. Other cases, however, have premised jurisdiction on the availability of a websites’ content in a forum state where the content produces ‘effects’ or harm in the forum state (seemingly indistinguishable from the above, practically speaking). For example, following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Calder v Jones,​[127]​ courts have found a defamatory publication on a website to be targeted to the claimant’s state of residence by the defendant who knew that the harm from its publication would occur there so as to give rise to jurisdiction over the out-of-state publisher.​[128]​ However, recently several Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have required more.​[129]​ 
The lack of consistency in US decisions involving conduct arising in connection with internet presence and activities creates some difficulty for internet actors. It is fairly unlikely however that mere availability of a website, without more, will render an out-of-jurisdiction insurer liable to an exercise of general jurisdiction in the US.
In the EU, Rome II Regulation governs jurisdiction for non-contractual liability, harmonising the localising factors and the applicable jurisdiction in light thereof across the EU Member States. This applies to tort or delict actions. Analysis of this is beyond the scope of this chapter, although an overview of the Rome I Regulation establishing a parallel harmonised regime applicable to contracts follows.
	Beyond scrutinising the content and architecture of its websites and systems for possible exposure to tort and regulatory liability, companies should have acceptable use policies with clear and enforced standards and procedures, and incorporated by reference into any employment contract, for employees’ email, internet, social networking, data handling and system security activities.
[b]3.3 Contract 
Where a contract is ‘made’ or concluded online under contract law usually depends where acceptance occurs, absent agreement to the contrary. Thus, e-commerce websites usually seek to structure the transaction as an offer to treat rather than an offer which could be accepted anywhere in the world, or they provide for choice of jurisdiction. Specific e-commerce, consumer protection and other laws may provide for limitation or enforcement of party autonomy in this regard with ensuing complexity for e-commerce transactions as to applicable jurisdiction and law in a cross-border environment. In the EU, for example, jurisdiction would need to be determined with reference to the Brussels I Regulation​[130]​ and national law; choice of law with respect to the Rome I Regulation,​[131]​ directives and national laws​[132]​ and, possibly in connection with subrogation rights, the Rome II Regulation regarding applicable law with respect to non-contractual obligations and the insurance directives.​[133]​ The labelling of this EU multilevel maze of rules for insurance contracts as the ‘“hell” of international private law’ may be justified.​[134]​ However, the following attempts to explain the rules that govern jurisdiction for claims involving contracts in EU Member States under the Brussels I Regulation.
[c]3.3.1 Brussels I Regulation and EU-domiciled defendants
The Brussels I Regulation governs legal disputes of a civil or commercial nature in EU Member States​[135]​ and is intended to harmonise issues of jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments throughout the EU. The Regulation has certain limited exceptions; it does not apply to matters such as those involving matrimonial property rights, rights of succession under wills, matters related to social security, arbitration and bankruptcy. 
The basic rule under the Brussels Regulation I is that a person, legal or natural, can only be sued in his Member State of domicile​[136]​ although a person can be domiciled in more than one Member State. A dispute arising out of operations of a branch, agency or other place of establishment can be heard in the Member State where the branch, agency or other place of establishment is situated.​[137]​ Under EU jurisprudence, a place of establishment must be a place where actual pursuit of economic activity occurs at a fixed location and for an indefinite period and where there are several places of establishment, which is the centre of the activities in connection with a particular service.​[138]​ For undertakings which provide services over the internet, this is not merely the locations of the servers hosting the website or where its website is accessed.​[139]​ However, as one commentator has suggested, the location of the technology is likely to be a factor in determining where the centre of activities lies when the place of establishment is not clear.​[140]​ This may not be simple. Internet-based operations could be designed based on distributed processing and hosting equipment in various locations for multiple, redundant and diverse high-speed internet connections, security systems and zones, as well as for cooling and environmental systems and redundant power. Such would minimise down time and the risk of any single point of crippling failure of the website, smooth traffic spikes, permit 24-hour live services and processing, and optimise operational and information security.
A further scheme of rules regarding special, exclusive and prorogated jurisdiction pursuant to party agreement operate to change the domiciliary Member State jurisdiction.​[141]​ Section 3 of Brussels Regulation I contains the special rules governing ‘jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance’. These provide that an EU-domiciled insurer can be sued:
[quotation: list]
a)	In the Member State of its domicile, or
b)	In the Member State of the claimant’s domicile in actions brought by a policyholder, an insured or beneficiary under a policy;
c)	If a co-insurer, in Member State in which proceedings are brought against the lead insurer. (Article 9(1)).[/quotation]
A non-EU insurer with a branch, agency or other establishment in a Member State is deemed domiciled there for purposes of disputes arising from such operations,​[142]​ corresponding to the provisions in Article 5(5). Thus, the same issues in connection with place of ‘establishment’ as discussed previously arise here. Also, different kinds of policies give rise to other special rules for both EU (or deemed) domiciled insurers.​[143]​ Generally, the online factor does not otherwise impact the application of the rules with respect to insurers under Section 3.
The phrases ‘matters relating to insurance’ and ‘insurance’ are undefined in the Regulation.​[144]​ The special jurisdiction rules are, however, stated to be intended to protect the weaker party.​[145]​ Also, the reference to the ‘insured’, ‘policyholder’ and ‘beneficiary’, as well as contracts of insurance, suggest that such related matters as a reinsurance contract, generally between equals, are implicitly not included, a conclusion reached by the European Court of Justice in Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company (UGIC),​[146]​ under the prior Brussels Convention.​[147]​ However, where an insured, policyholder or beneficiary is permitted to proceed directly against an insurer, such as in an insolvency scenario, this comprises an insurance matter within the special rules.​[148]​ Claims relating to other insurance matters, for example agency contract disputes or bordereaux accounting disputes, etc., would similarly need to be analysed under whether the particular protection of the special rule is justified as above since a derogation from the general rule cannot ‘give rise to an interpretation beyond the cases envisaged … ’.​[149]​ 
While Section 3 may encompass all matters relating to insurance involving consumers, the mutual operational exclusivity of Section 3 and Section 4 which sets the special jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts is not specifically stated.​[150]​ Under the rationale in Group Josi, it is possible that both sections, affording additional protection to the weaker party, apply in the context of consumer insurance contracts and serve as alternative options to the general rule.​[151]​ This position might further be supported by the fact that Section 4’s scope appears to encompass all consumer contracts meeting its requirements, again without derogation. The practical operation of such a further option for consumers might not ultimately make a difference given the breadth of the insurance jurisdiction provisions, although a further analysis of whether these sections are truly co-extensive is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in light of potential overlap, the following explores an issue with e-commerce implications. 
Article 15, Section 4 of the Regulation provides special consumer jurisdiction rules. These enable a consumer​[152]​ also to sue in his own Member State a defendant pursuing commercial/professional activities in that State or, by any means, directing such activities to the State for claims arising out of those activities.​[153]​ If applicable to insurance, this could govern not only personal lines but also certain commercial insurance sales, including online sales.
The ECJ recently considered whether activity presented on a website by a trader or an intermediary comprises the ‘directing’ of activity to a Member State of the consumer’s domicile in the combined cases of Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Heller.​[154]​ The Court of Justice held that the intent of the vendor to direct such activity to another Member State is the key factor to be considered and set an objective test for determining when such intent is likely to be found, thus triggering Article 15(1)(c) special jurisdiction. This intent was previously implicit in non-online activities such as advertising placed in other national newspapers or door-to-door sales and flyers or specific TV commercials broadcast locally. However, with internet activity such as a website, this is no longer the case. Although, for Article 15(1)(c) to apply, the trader must have manifested its intention to establish commercial relations with consumers from one or more other Member States, the Court held that the mere fact of a website accessible in another Member State is insufficient. Rather, it is necessary to determine whether before any contract with the consumer was concluded, ‘there was evidence demonstrating that the trader was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in other Member States, including the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in the sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with those consumers’.​[155]​ The ECJ ruled out factors such as inclusion on the website of the trader’s email or geographical address, or telephone number without an international code. Such cannot, according to the ECJ, comprise indicia of ‘directing’ activity, as this information is necessary for others, including consumers domiciled in the Member State of the trader’s establishment, to make contact with it, and is information legally mandated to be provided by, for example, the Electronic Commerce Directive.​[156]​
While statements that services are offered in the particular Member State would be clear evidence, less obvious indicators can suffice. The ECJ provided a non-exhaustive list of factors constituting evidence of activity ‘directed to’ one or more other Member States within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c), including:
[bl]
	the international nature of the activity at issue, such as certain tourist activities, but not dispositive itself as these could be directed only within the Member State;
	mention of telephone numbers with the international code; 
	use of a top-level domain name other than that of the trader’s Member State such as for example ‘.de’ when the trader is located in Austria;
	use of neutral top-level domain names such as ‘.com’ or ‘.eu’; 
	itineraries from other Member States to where the service is provided;
	mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member States, in particular by presentation of accounts written by such customers;
	use of a language or a currency other than those generally used in the trader’s Member State of establishment with the possibility of making and confirming the reservation in that other language, but not when it is also the language/currency of this Member State;
	outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other Member States.​[157]​[/list]
According to the ECJ, such factors relating to the trader’s overall activity may warrant the conclusion that a trader envisages doing business with customers domiciled in the European Union, whatever the Member State. It also found irrelevant whether the website is that of an intermediary company involved in directing the activity, where the company was acting for and on behalf of a trader. Here, not only must relevant national courts ascertain whether sufficient evidence of intent to direct activity exists, but also whether the trader was or should have been aware of the international dimension of the intermediary company’s activity and how the intermediary company and the trader were linked.​[158]​ 
While this test of intent is less onerous than the mere fact of contract and looks to pre-contractual matters, application of these factors blindly could render traders subject to law and jurisdiction of Member States in which they never really intended to conduct business and undermine their common use of ordinary e-commerce practices. For example, search engine optimisation is a critical factor in getting a site to appear on the first search engine pages. Geo-targeted traffic, however, is still an emerging technology, even with larger search engines. Also some of the items included in the Court’s criteria are often available in a website via an embedded third-party service such as ‘Get directions’ or Maps from Google or Map Quest. These will show an itinerary based on whatever address the user inserts, whether from within the same Member State or not. There are customer review services that allow reviews by customers who may be former Member State domiciliaries or even just visitors. Also, deciding to use a .com or .eu address could be unrelated to the intent to direct activity to another Member State. It could be merely a choice available for a particular domain name of the registrar used or based on the protection of intellectual property such as trademarks or for small businesses which often purchase web building/hosting packages choices dictated by that party’s built-in infrastructure and choice. Many businesses may just prefer .com, for example, because it is easier for customers to remember. 
Even if the consumer provisions of the Regulation under Article 4 do not apply to insurance contracts, for example under the statutory construction principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the decision clearly has precedential or persuasive authority beyond its application under the Brussels I Regulation. For example, the case could have certain implications, for instance liability under insurance and other financial services advertising regulations for websites. It could also have implications for the application of other conduct of business regulations where cross-border electronic communications modalities are used, such as the use of Facebook or Twitter by insurance/financial services providers or intermediaries to promote themselves and their products. Whatever its potential implications, it shows that in constructing and planning their websites, EU insurance professionals will need to be careful and may consider establishing corporate guidelines and document decisions made as to the use of various technologies and services, as well as the changes to the website itself.
[c]3.3.2 Jurisdiction and non-EU defendants
Traditional national rules of jurisdiction apply for a non-EU domiciliary​[159]​ unless the matter is one that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Member State​[160]​ or is conferred by agreement.​[161]​ The exclusive jurisdiction rules apply in instances where the EU country has integral links to a matter, such as those involving rights in real property or proceedings concerning rights such as patents or trademarks where deposit or registration in the Member State has occurred or been applied for or where party choice as to jurisdiction has been agreed in writing.​[162]​ 
As with other nations, the private international law rules of the individual EU Member States typically base exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in civil matters on identified links to the territory, such as the place of contract or performance, locus of the tortious conduct or the effect/harm from the conduct, nationality, residence or domicile, agreement to exclusive jurisdiction, and temporary physical presence, etc.​[163]​ Under the Brussels Regulation, EU domiciled claimants may avail themselves generally of the jurisdictional powers of any Member State,​[164]​ with this choice seemingly governing any further consideration by the courts of contracting states.​[165]​ As examined earlier, application of traditional factors in the online environment may not always be clear, such as where a contract is entered into or its breach occurs. The law continues to develop.
An analysis of jurisdiction exercise globally in the context of the internet and e-commerce is beyond the very limited scope of this chapter.​[166]​ Suffice it to say that there is the possibility to be found liable in multiple jurisdictions based on a variety of factors, including in some instances the mere availability of access to content on a website. That a contract was formed and/or performed in a jurisdiction comprises a traditional basis for jurisdiction which the internet itself does not change, although it may operate to challenge enforcement.​[167]​ 
Those transacting business online should avail themselves of all technological and contractual measures possible to manage their exposure. As geo-location technologies grow more sophisticated, this will become easier. Many internet businesses have specific webpages designed for each jurisdiction in which they wish to transact business. While not a guarantee that a contract would never be entered into outside that jurisdiction, it could avoid a finding of directing or targeting. 
Finally, the question of jurisdiction may also be layered with the issue of discretion by the court not to exercise it although it is found to exist, such as forum non conveniens. 
[b]3.4 Choice of Law
The choice of which law or laws applies in a matter is often strategic to its outcome but is often complex. In the context of insurance, determinations of coverage and policy construction can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction even when virtually identical policy wording is involved. Beyond the context of insurance policies, choice of law may be important with virtual joint ventures such as insurance web portals or other online platforms operated by joint venture partners established in different jurisdictions.
Different jurisdictions can also apply a different construction to the same choice of law rule, with the place of an insurance contract, or lex loci contractus, comprising the place where the policy is delivered or the place of execution with the premium paid. In the context of the internet, these both may be an entirely different place from where the insurer intended. Different choice of law rules apply in different jurisdictions. The US alone has 51 different jurisdictions which have their own choice of law (here called ‘conflicts of law’) rules.
Even where there exist ‘mandatory rules’ such as those under the EU Rome I Regulation which governs choice of law including rules for insurance contracts in the EU Member States, there are derogations and discretionary applications as well as decisions limiting discretion or party autonomy.​[168]​
Further, in a single matter, different laws of different jurisdictions can apply to different issues. Even the choice as to which choice of law rules apply, to what and when creates incentives to engage in the gaming of the system to file an action in the jurisdiction most likely to uphold the law most favourable to the plaintiff’s position, both on matters substantive and procedural. There are tomes by noted scholars with exquisite mastery of the subject, including in the context of insurance issues. Given this complexity, the following seeks only to set out the very basics and to explore some issues that arise in the context of insurance and e-commerce.
Outside of the EU regulations and other conventions with neighbouring states, decisions as to which law or laws apply to the issues in a contract or claim is based primarily on the nation’s particular conflict of law framework, although limited international law exists.​[169]​ As with jurisdiction, this is usually decided by reference to specific localising factors or to principles for balancing which jurisdictions’ interests require that their law be applied.​[170]​ This might not only be the substantive law of contract (or tort in the case), but also procedural laws that could affect substantive rights, for example statutes of limitations. In the US both approaches are followed. An overview is therefore worthwhile to understanding each.
The US is a nation with many sovereign states, each with its own laws governing all private law matters. It has a significant body of choice/conflict of law cases, many involving insurance disputes, which has evolved over time with the two different approaches taking precedence in different states.​[171]​ The first applies the localising factor of lex loci delicti, the place where the wrong occurred, to tort cases and lex loci contractus in matters arising from contract.​[172]​ Here the law of the state where a contract was made, or, under supplementary principles, was to be performed, governs the interpretation of the contract. This approach was followed in first half of the twentieth century; it remains that of a minority of states, although not uniformly followed in all situations.​[173]​ ‘Made’ is given different meanings by different states, including: the place where the last act legally necessary to bring the contract into force takes place;​[174]​ the place where the contract was issued or delivered,​[175]​ or the place of execution and/or premium payment. ‘Delivered’ has at least two possible constructions in connection with a policy: the place that the policyholder took possession of the policy​[176]​ and where the insurer placed it into the mail for the insured.​[177]​ However, with internet transactions, it may be uncertain as to where the contract was made. 
These fairly inflexible tests, described as ‘necessary to ensure stability in contractual arrangements’​[178]​ were found to lead to harsh or absurd outcomes. As a result, a revised doctrine emerged​[179]​ that is now followed by most states. This considers a range of principles and factors to determine the most significant relationship between the issue and the states affected.​[180]​ These include, in the absence of a controlling state choice of law requirement:
[quotation: list]
(a)	needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b)	relevant policies of the forum,
(c)	relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d)	protection of justified expectations, 
(e)	basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f)	certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g)	ease in determination and application of the law to be applied.​[181]​[/quotation]
Under this ‘Second Restatement’ approach, the court analyses on an issue-by-issue basis, that is dépeçage, so that one state’s law can govern one issue and a different state’s, another. This complex approach has not, however, itself been without criticism, including that it exchanged simple ‘territorial rules for mind-numbing lists of territorial contacts’ to be considered, and often without analysis of whether a true conflict exists.​[182]​ 
There are additionally US constitution limits as to whether a particular state’s law can be applied. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit clause​[183]​ apply. The former requires that there be sufficient minimum contacts with the state whose law is to be applied, similar analysis to that to determine jurisdiction, previously discussed.​[184]​ 
In addition to these typically common-law rules, various states have choice of law statutes that also govern insurance contracts.​[185]​ Some address only mandatory coverages such as auto insurance; others more broadly address contracts insuring property, lives, or interests in the state, deeming them made within that state with disputes resolved by reference to that state’s substantive law. 
One answer to the uncertainty that may arise with choice of law, particularly with respect to online transactions, may be to ensure an appropriate choice of law clause in the applicable contract. With B2C transactions, enforceability of such clauses is an issue. In the US these are usually upheld in consumer contracts, as long as the terms are not unconscionable.​[186]​ This is not necessarily true of other jurisdictions, including the EU where a choice of law clause cannot operate to alter consumer protection. 
Arbitration clauses could offer even greater assurance that the choice of applicable law would be followed. Again enforceability is an issue. Clearly worded provisions that are brought to the party’s attention in a website will serve to address some concerns, but issues of cost and location of mandatory arbitration will contribute to a finding of unconscionable terms, especially in relation to amount at issue.​[187]​ 
[a]4. THE INTERNET AND INSURANCE: SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The internet and e-commerce offer insurance businesses a range of potential opportunities, including the possibility for new cost-effective modes of distribution within a jurisdiction, especially with personal or retail insurance lines where access to web-based insurance portals and product comparison sites could permit purchasers to find, price and buy a policy that meets their needs to the extent that these are seen as effecting the role of brokers or agents.
That there could also be new and cost-effective ways of accessing new geographic markets by transacting online business on a cross-border basis is an ideal. It does not, however, seem likely that this will soon be reached in many jurisdictions. Cross-border legal compliance remains a confusing and costly endeavour, even in purportedly harmonised regimes such as the EU, before language, cultural and regulatory infrastructural differences such as dispute resolution or claims handling are taken into account. The industry has adapted its operations and distribution structures to geographic boundaries largely due to the legal boundaries of insurance regulation. Global brokers and insurers with authorisations nearly everywhere have always masked the effect of these restrictions for their large commercial clients or the client has gone to insurance markets willing to write risks on an offshore basis. This will likely continue for the immediate future although with more efficient, effective and transparent processes via electronic systems for applications, underwriting, policy and endorsement issuance and better access to information and transparency in nearly real time.
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